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NOTES 
The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of 
Exclusionary Zoning· 
Cases of ·alleged exclusionary zoning1 have prompted much discus-
sion of numerous issues of substance2 and procedure.8 Until recently, 
though, little attention has been directed toward the problems that 
ia court may encounter when it must fashion an appropriate remedy 
for a plaintiff who successfully demonstrates the existence of unlawful 
zoning. When a plaintiffs aim is to build low- or moderate-income 
housing upon •a specific plot of land and he seeks, as a first step, to 
have restrictions on that land invalidated on exclusionary zoning 
grounds, courts have little difficulty framing a remedial deoree with 
reference to the particular plot.4 In the past few years, however, 
1. No precise definition of "exclusionary zoning" will be attempted. The term 
refers, in general, to schemes of zoning that have either the purpose or effect of 
excluding or sharply limiting low- and moderate-priced housing from the municipality 
in question, and thus that exclude persons of low or moderate income. See generally 
Burns, Class Struggle in the Suburbs: Exclusionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2 HAST, 
CONST. L.Q. 179 (1975). 
2. Successful attacks have been made on a number of zoning ordinance features, 
including minimum acreage requirements, minimum floor-space requirements, mini-
mum frontage requirements, and total exclusion of certain uses (for instance, apart-
ments or mobile homes) from the municipality. See generally E. BE.ROMAN, 
ELIMINATING ExcLUSlONARY ZoNlNG (1974). In many cases an equal protection 
argument has been advanced. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, 
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 SrAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary 
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAR.v. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, The Equal 
Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 Y ALB 
LJ. 61 (1971). In a few cases, plaintiffs have alleged an infringement on their right 
to travel. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Assn. of Sonoma County v. City of 
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Fielding, The Right To 
Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulation?, 39 U. au. 
L. R.Ev. 612 (1972). In other cases, a state constitutional provision has been 
advanced as a basis for decision. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P, 
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 
423 U.S. 808 (1975). For a compilation of cases decided on these and other 
grounds, see Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1210 (1973). 
3. The most important issue of procedure that has affected exclusionary zoning 
cases is standing. A recent Supreme Court decision, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975), may have sharply limited access to federal courts for nonresident plaintiffs 
charging a municipality with exclusionary zoning, by I11andating that a plaintiff 
challenging exclusionary zoning practices must allege facts demonstrating that the 
challenged practices personally harmed the plaintiff. See text at notes 91-99 infra. 
4. The remedial question in most cases has been confined to a consideration of 
whether to make limited adjustments for specific proposed uses. See cases cited in 
notes 19-28 infra. Most articles that discuss remedies in such cases have done so in 
what amount to postscripts to arguments for finding exclusionary zoning unconstitu-
tional. See sources cited in note 114 infra. Nevertheless, a few recent discussions 
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plaintiffs such-as the N.A.A.C.P. who act on behalf of individuals of 
below-average means have sought to "open" a municipality by having 
its zoning ordinance judicially altered to permit multi-unit housing 
projects. Because such plaintiffs often have no property interests in 
the community, or at least have no plans to ibuild on any particular 
plots, courts attempting to ,fashion remedies have confronted the 
possibility of rezoning entire municipalities. 
One court that recently faced this situation intimated a willingness 
to afford community-wide relief to plaintiffs who successfully chal-
lenge entire zoning ordinances on exclusionary grounds. In Southern 
Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel,5 the 
New Jersey supreme court considered a challenge to a township 
ordinance that effectiively excluded low- and moderate-income families 
by (1) •allocating excessive amounts of land to industrial use, 6 (2) 
limiting •all residental areas to single family dwellings, and (3) impos-
ing either minimum acreage, floor area and lot width requirements or 
cluster-development density limitations on the residential areas.7 The 
court determined that Mount Laurel's conduct was occasioned by a 
desire to attract only high ,tax ratables to the area, to hold down the 
cost of municipal services, and, in general, to exclude from the com-
munity those persons who lacked the income and resources necessary 
:to purchase relatively large, single-family homes.8 The court found 
the township's exclusionary · efforts unlawful as a matter of state 
constitutional law and thus had no call to consider the federal consti-
tutional grounds urged by the plaintiffs. In the court's view, the New 
Jersey constitution required that all municipal zoning practices pro-
mote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, with "gen-
eral" welfare broadly defined: 9 "[T]he universal and constant need 
have criticized judicial practices in fashioning remedies. See, e.g., Note, A Wrong 
Without a Remedy: Judicial Approaches to Exclusionary Zoning, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN 
L.J. 727 (1975); Note, Beyond lnvalida#on: The Judicial Power To Zone, 9' URB. L. 
ANNUAL 159 (1975). 
5. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
The decision has already received considerable attention in the literature. See, e.g., 
Rose, The Mount Laurel Decision: Is It Based on Wishful Thinking? 4 REAL &TATE 
LJ. 61 (1975); Slade, Mt. Laurel: A View from the Bridge, 27 LAND UsE L. & 
ZoNINo DIGEST, No. 6, at 15 (1975); Williams & Doughty, Studif!S in Legal Realism; 
Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. RE.v. 73 (1975). 
6. The court noted that while 4,121 acres, 30 per cent of the total municipal 
acreage, were zoned for industry, only about 100 acres were actually being used for 
industrial purposes; the balance remained vacant. 67 NJ. at 162-63, 336 A.2d at 
719. 
7. 67 N.J. at 163, 336 A.2d at 719. One apartment complex had been approved 
by the town, but it was limited to persons over the age of 52, with no more than 
three residents permitted in any one unit. 67 N.J. at 168-69-, 336 A.2d at 722. 
8. New Jersey has no state income tax; hence, local real-estate taxes bear most of 
the burden of local governmental and educational costs. 67 N.J. at 171, 336 A.2d at 
723. 
9. The New Jersey constitution allows the enactment of zoning laws as a function 
of the police power, N.J. CoNsT. art. 4, § VI, para. 2, but it says nothing about 
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for [low- and moderate-income] housing is so important and of such 
broad public interest that the general welfare which developing mu-
nicipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their 
boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of 
the particular municipality."10 Each developing municipality, the 
court stated, "must, by its land use regulations, make realistically 
possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of 
housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there, of 
course including those of low and moderate income."11 The amount 
of land devoted to a particular type of housing was to be determined 
by the municipality's "fair share" of regional needs.12 
The trial court in Mount Laurel had invalidated the entire ordi-
nance and ordered the township to formulate a plan of affirmative 
action to encourage .the satisfaction of low- and moderate-income 
housing needs.13 The New Jersey supreme court modified this reme-
dial decree in two respects. First, it declared that the zoning ordi-
nance was invalid "only to the extent and in the particulars set forth 
in this opinion,"14 a declaration of uncertain effect because, in the 
course of its opinion, the court mentioned most of the ordinance's 
features. Second, the court vacated the lower court's order for 
preparation and submission of a rezoning plan and, instead, offered 
ithe township an opportunity to remedy the defects in the ordinance 
without "judicial supervision."1ri The court concluded by warning 
that "[s]hould Mount Laurel not perform as we expect, further 
judicial action may be sought by supplemental pleading in this 
cause."16 This final caveat suggests that, if ,the township does not 
respond to judicial exhortations to rezone for low- and moderate-
income dwellings, the court itself will play a more active role in 
directing broad-based rezoning. However, the court's vague admoni-
tion contains no hint of the specific actions that it will take in these 
circumstances. 
the "general welfare." Justice Hall, however, asserted that this requirement could be 
found in paragraph 1 of article 1, which demands that all police power regulation 
conform to substantive due process and equal protection guidelines. The requirement 
of general welfare is explicitly stated in the enabling legislation, N.J. STAT. ANN, § 
40:55-32 (1964), but Justice Hall took pains to emphasize a constitutional basis for 
his decision. 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725. Justice Mountain, concurring, relied 
solely upon the statutory requirement, finding resort to the constitution unnecessary, 
67 NJ. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735. 
10. 67 NJ. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727-28. 
11. 67 NJ. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32. 
12. The court recognized that a determination of the region might vary from 
situation to situation. However, in this case it had no difficulty defining the 
appropriate region as those portions of three counties within twenty miles of Camden 
City. 67 N.J. at 189-90, 336 A.2d at 733. 
13. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 
N.J. Super, 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div. 1972). 
14. 67 NJ. at 191, 336 A.2d at 734. 
15. 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. 
16. 67 NJ. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. 
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This Note presents and evaluates the possible judicial responses to 
cases, like Mount Laurel, that involve challenges to entire zoning 
ordinances on exclusionary grounds.17 It argues that pragmatic and 
legal difficulties militate against any judicial imposition of affirmative 
relief not tailored to specific tracts of land and suggests that the most 
effective resolution of the problems confronted by low-income hous-
ing advocates lies in comprehensive legislative programs. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL ROLE IN 
ZoNING CASES 
The cases in which plaintiffs have sought relief with respect to 
specific tracts of land provide little direct legal precedent for shaping 
appropriate remedies in cases where plaintiffs seek community-wide 
relief. However, because these prior cases compelled many courts 
consciously ,to consider and articulate the judiciary's proper role in 
zoning controversies, they do provide useful guidance for courts faced 
with more complex, Mount Laurel-type situations. Specifically, after 
evaluating their own technical competence and the propriety of judi-
cial zoning, most courts faced with challenges to particular tracts have 
followed one of two -basic approaches in concluding that they should 
not dictate specific zoning classifications. The first approach has 
been to acknowledge the presence of unreasonable zoning but to 
grant no affirmative remedy beyond invalidating the arbitracy_ and 
capricious classifications.18 Courts taking this position have asserted 
that more far-reaching remedies would require judicial consideration 
of such matters as future growth and development, the availability of 
,public facilities, and population density. Because these are problems 
that call for significant expertise and necessitate difficult judgments of 
:public· policy for their resolution, they are viewed as falling within an 
area of peculiarly legislative competence.19 Courts have, in fact, 
concluded that the judiciary is barred by the doctrine of separation of 
powers from ordering that tracts of land be granted particular zoning 
classifications. 20 In the words of one court: "As tempting as it 
17. Obviously, a case similar to Mount Laurel could not be brought in a federal 
court after Warth, supra note 3. It is interesting to note that standing presented no 
problem for the New Jersey supreme court, which dismissed the question in a foot-
note in Mount Laurel. See 67 N.J. at 160, 336 A.2d at 717 n.3. 
18. In Emjay Properties v. Town of Brookhaven, 42 App. Div. 2d 907, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1973), for example, the court affirmed a finding that a particular 
residence-district designation was unconstitutional and void, but concluded that only 
the legislature could determine how the property should be rezoned. 
19. See City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 S.2d 836, 837-38 (Fla. 1969). 
20. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. McGeary, 291 S.2d 28, 29 (Fla. App. 
1974); Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508, 511 (1971). The 
court in City of El Paso v. McArthur, 473 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), 
reversed a lower court's ruling that had annulled a zoning ordinance and said in 
dictum: "Not only did the trial Court annul the zoning ordinance, but it decided 
which of the various possible zoning classifications should be applied to the disputed 
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sometimes may ibe, a court is without power to substitute its zoning 
philosophy for that of .the zoning ·body. "21 
A second judicial approach has been to make limited adjustments 
to a zoning pattern in order to permit a particular proposed use on a 
specific plot of land when a municipality's refusal to rezone has •been 
unreasonable. Courts adopting this approach have also recognized 
that zoning is a legislative function22 and ·have thus ,tried to shape 
narrow decrees that permit the use contemplated by the plaintiff but 
do not -actually rezone ,the land. For example, a recent decision of 
the Virginia supreme court23 instructs courts of that state to suspend 
.any adjudication of invalidity for a specified .period in order to give 
the municipality an opportunity to enact amendments rectifying the 
offensive provision or classification. The adjudication becomes op-
erative, •and an injunction forbidding the municipality from interfer-
ing with the proposed use takes effect, only if the municipality fails to 
comply within the specified period.24 Similarly, Pennsylvania courts 
may, pursuant to statute, 25 order that proposed uses be allowed in full 
or in part if the local zoning appeals board has unreasonably refused 
to do so. Interestingly enough, the Pennsylvania judiciary has ac-
cepted -this power with great reluctance, and, indeed, has maintained 
in •at least one case that the function properly belongs to the legisla-
ture. 26 
Although the tendency to defer to -the legislature is the prevailing 
one among the courts, a recent case in which plaintiffs' interests 
focused on particular tracts of land does evidence some judicial 
property. .Jt substituted its judgment for that of the administrative or legislative body, 
and contrary to its authorized function." 473 S.W.2d at 322. See also Herzog v. 
City of Pocatello, 363 P.2d 188 (Idaho 1961). Some courts, without explicitly 
referring to separation of powers doctrines, have nonetheless invalidated a portion of 
an ordinance without ordering specific property rezoned in any way. See, e.g., Girsh 
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
21. Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 225, 504 P.2d 
344, 348 (1972). 
22. In LaSalle Natl. Bank v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App. 2d 457, 460, 264 
N.E.2d 799, 801 (1970), the court attempted to define its role: 
While the courts possess the authority to pass upon the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance, this authority does not include the power to determine the ultimate classi-
fication. • • • Since the practical effect of declaring an existing zoning ordi-
nance void in regard to a particular piece of property is to leave that piece of 
property in an unzoned condition, the court may frame its order· in reference 
to a specific proposal before it and find that the contemplated use would be a 
reasonable one. • . • However, the court must exercise this authority with ex-
treme care to avoid any encroachment into the legislative function of zoning. 
The Illinois courts have consistently adhered to this position. See, e.g., Stalzer v. 
Village of Matteson, 14 Ill. App. 3d 891, 303 N.E.2d 489 (1973); First Natl. 
Bank of Lake Forest v. Village of Northbrook, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 278 N.E.2d 533 
(1971). 
23. City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975). 
24. 215 Va. at-, 211 S.E.2d. at 62. 
25. PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (1972). 
26. See Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commnw. 404, 415, 333 A.2d 239, 
246 (1975). 
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willingness to play a more activist role in zoning controversies. Thus, 
in Pascack Association v. Mayor and Council of the Township of 
Washington, 27 the owner and contract purchaser of specific lands in 
Washington township appealed from the denial of their request for a 
variance to build garden apartments. While the plaintiffs principally 
sought relief with respect to their particular lands, they buttressed 
their position by challenging the township's basic zoning ordinance 
on exclusionary grounds. 
Jn its initial decision, the court sustained the exclusionrary chal-
lenge, but instead of shaping a decree with reference to the plaintiffs' 
land, it remanded to the township for rezoning to permit multi-family 
housing and for reformation of the township's minimum lot size, 
depth, and frontage requirements. The resulting amendments did not 
satisfy the plaintiffs, whose property was not reclassified, and they re-
quested further judicial relief. The court then concluded that little 
of the rezoned land was actually availa:ble for the construction of 
multi-unit housing and ordered changes within sixty days. When 
changes were not forthcoming, the court engaged the services of ur-
ban planning experts who determined that a need existed for rental 
apartments and recommended both rezoning of certain lands and 
modification of restrictive building requirements. Despite objections 
by the township that the judiciary lacked the power to rezone, ,the 
court invoked the examples of school desegregation and reapportion-
ment cases and rezoned plaintiffs' lands in a detailed manner.28 Thus, 
while it continued to recognize the need for judicial restraint, the 
Pascack court ultimately acted on the premise that "the judiciary has 
historically and necessarily exercised its power to compel coordinate 
branches of government to fulfill their obligations as defined by the 
courts."29 
27. 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (L. Div. 1974). In at least one other case, 
a court admitted the possibility that it would rezone. In Southern Alameda Spanish 
Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 357 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 
1970), the court denied a request for an injunction that would have rezoned a 
particular site. The court, however, went on to order the city to take whatever steps 
were necessary to accommodate the needs of its low-income residents. The court 
retained jurisdiction in the matter, implying that it might act should the city fail to do 
so. Apparently, however, an accommodation was reached, for no further opinions in 
the case have been reported. 
28. 131 N.J. Super. at 203, 329 A.2d at 94. Cf. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 
U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1975) (directing rezoning of property for multi-unit 
dwelling dev~lopment after finding village's refusal to do so a perpetuation of 
segregated housing patterns); City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1973) ( directing that respondent's property be rezoned multi-family residen-
tial where comprehensive plan and planning commission recommended such a use and 
city board of aldermen could adduce no evidence suggesting that another use was 
more appropriate); Daraban v. Township of Redford, 383 Mich. 497, 176 N.W.2d 
598 (1970) (granting plaintiff authorization to start R-3 construction when township 
agreed R-1 classification was unreasonable with respect to property and when town-
ship has neither requested time to enact an amendment nor made such an amendment 
part of the record). 
29. 131 N.J. Super. at 203, 309 A.2d at 94 (emphasis added). 
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Pascack is a deviation from the dominant view of the proper role 
for the courts in zoning controversies-a view that has emphasized 
the impropriety of courts operating as "superzoning" bodies. Indeed, 
even when reversing unreasonable acts ·by zoning ·bodies, courts have 
tried to minimize .their interference with the classification policies 
established by the local authorities. This traditional refusal of courts 
to implement their own zoning philosophies in limited settings involv-
ing specific tracts of land counsels other courts, in deciding zoning 
cases of all sorts, to ask whether the decisions to be made are better 
left to legislative bodies. When an entire municipality, rather than a 
single plot of land, is involved, this question can be answered only 
with reference to the judiciary's technical planning competence and 
its -capacity to solicit and absorb expert advice, as well as the more 
abstract consideration of whether the policies at issue should be 
established by the elected repre~ntatives- of the people. These fac-
tors provide a •basis for evaluating the possible judicial responses to a 
zoning ordinance that is exclusionary in its total effect. 
II. PossmLE JUDICIAL REsPONSES TO EXCLUSIONARY 
Z.ONING SCHEMES 
This section evaluates the three courses of action available to courts 
faced with zoning ordinance challenges -by plaintiffs whose interests 
transcend specific tracts of land: simple invalidation of offensive 
features of the ordinance, implementation of a new zoning scheme, 
and the withholding of all affirmative relief. By remanding for 
action by the focal zoning board, the Mount Laurel court has delayed 
having to choose a final course of action for either the Mount Laurel 
litigation, should the board prove recalcitrant, or for future New 
Jersey cases. Of course, future-action by local authorities may render 
additional judicial effort unnecessary. But, as -the following discus-
sion suggests, such a remand may well be inconsistent with the most 
appropriate judicial role in such zoning controversies, as well as costly 
to the parties. 
A. Simple Invalidation 
One 1:emedy a court might adopt in response to proof that a zoning 
ordinance is unlawfully exclusionary is to invalidate the offensive fea-
tures of the zoning ordinance without itself participating in the rezon-
ing process.30 Thus, the court might strike down minimum acreage, 
minimum frontage, and minimum floor-space requirements as they 
apply to the entire community, rather than to a particular tract, as in 
30. This approach was used in National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. 
of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the first case in which a state 
supreme court held a minimum-acreage requirement invalid, 
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,the more itraditional case. Similarly, a zoning ordinance could be 
held unconstitutional-because it excludes a particular type of dwell-
ing, such as apartment buildings.31 This kind of "negative" remedy 
has the merit of permitting courts to grant relief to plaintiffs without 
dictating a final zoning pattern to the municipality; thus, undue 
judicial encroachment upon legislative functions is avoided.32 
This approach of simple invalidation may be effective in some 
instances, either in itself or as a catalyst for further remedial action by 
the municipality, but it is subject to at least two significant shor.tcom-
ings. First, in many challenges to an entire ordinance, as in Mount 
Laurel, no single feature can be identified as responsible for the 
pattern of exclusionary zoning. To remedy the unlawful exclusiop_ in 
such a case, a court following this approach would be required to 
invalidate most features of the ordinance. Broad-based invalidation 
would leave the municipality virtually without land-use regulations 
and would give developers a chance to build industrial plants in 
heretofore residential areas, or to construct high-rise apartments in 
areas environmentally unsuited for high-density population. Invali-
dation, in short, might lead to the type of haphazard development 
that zoning was designed to prevent. 33 
The second major shortcoming of simple invalidation is that it does 
not compel a municipality to remedy the features of its zoning scheme 
that the court found objectionable. The local authorities are free to 
adopt a scheme as unsatisfactory as that which was struck down. Such 
an attempt -to circumvent the court's decision may either ·be admitted 
openly or rationalized as an attempt to avoid uncontrolled develop-: 
ment while the zoning board devises a new zoning scheme. The 
likelihood that the rezoning would be unacceptable and -that it would 
stimulate new lawsuits prompted the Virginia supreme court to reject 
simple invalidation.34 Moreover, the danger of such a reaction by 
31. See, e.g., Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
32. See generally cases cited in notes 20-24 supra. 
33. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392-93 (1926). 
Many have argued that zoning is an ineffectivi; means of land-use control and have 
proposed alternatives. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, LAND USE Wrrn:oUT ZoNING (1972); 
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L REV. 681 (1973); McDougal, Performance Standards: A 
Viable Alternative to Euclidian Zoning?, 41 TuL. L REV. 255 (1973); Siegan, 
Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants, Zoning, State and Federal 
Regulation, 5 ENv. L. 385 (19-75). Professor Siegan has argued, in the two sources 
cited above and elsewhere, that zoning impedes the functioning of the free market by 
limiting the available land. The constricted supply drives up prices, and makes 
housing more expensive and less available than it would otherwise have been. Siegan 
points to Houston as proof that the absence of zoning need not necessarily result in 
haphazard development. But cf. Comment, Houston's Invention of Necessity-An 
Unconstitutional Substitute for Zoning?, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 307 (1969). Regardless 
of the merits of these proposals, they are not available to a court in an exclusionary 
zoning case since, presumably, the court will not develop its own method of land-use 
control to replace that enacted by the legislature. 
34. City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, -, 211 S.E.2d 56, 60-61 (1975). 
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local zoning authorities is not merely speculative. After the Pennsyl-
vania supreme court, in Girsh Appeal,35 invalidated a local ordinance 
because it excluded all apartments, defendant Nether Providence 
Township rezoned a quarry for apartment use; Girsh continued his 
struggle for a time, but finally desisted without erecting the apart-
ments.36 It seems, then, that the efficaciousness of simple invalida-
tion will often turn on the municipality's willingness to cooperate with 
courts in making land available for low- and moderate-income hous-
ing. Given the antagonism of many communities to this kind of 
development, 37 the judiciary cannot rely on invalidation as the princi-
pal approach to remedy exclusionary zoning. 
B. Implementation of a New Zoning Scheme 
A far more -activist judicial response is to ;proceed beyond invalida-
tion and to implement, directly or indirectly, a new zoning scheme. At 
first glance this approach appears to embrace at least three distinct 
judicial options. Fil'S1:, the colllt could declare the zoning scheme 
unconstitutional, explain its reasons, and instruct the defendant mu-
nicipality -to implement a new scheme that conforms to the court's 
general requirements.38 Second, the court could itself decide how 
muoh land should be allocated to low- and moderate-income housing, 
but allow the municipality to decide which portions of the town to 
inolude in that -allocation. Third, the colllt could bypass entirely the 
decision-making bodies of the municipality by imposing its own 
zoning scheme. 
A court that seeks to go beyond simple invalidation while main-
taining some deference toward local zoning boards must realize that 
success of the first two options depends largely on •the municipality's 
cooperation-a dubious prospect in light of the original need for a 
lawsuit and the apparent failure of invalidation to break up exclusion-
ary zoning patterns. Accordingly, a court fuat is considering adop-
tion of the less drastic options must be prepared to adopt the third, 
more far-reaching approach of judicial zoning in the wake of a 
municipality's intransigence. 
Thus, a court might adopt the first option of simply instructing the 
municipality to formulate a plan consistent with the -court's opinion in 
order to adhere to the traditional prinoiple, expressed in Mount 
Laurel, that "[t]he municipality should first have full opportunity to it-
relf act without judicial supervision."39 This option accords with the 
35. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
36. See E. BERGMAN, supra note 2, at 193. 
37. See generally Rose, supra note 5. A specific example of this antagonism is 
related in the newspaper article cited in note 42 infra. 
38. This is, in effect, the remedy provided by the Mount Laurel court. See 67 N.J. 
at 191, 336 A.2d at 734. 
39. 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. 
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norm.al restraint of federal courts in devising remedies for cases arising 
under the eqwill. protection clause, 40 but it concurrently suffers from a 
weakness demonstrated in school desegregation· and public housing 
site selection cases. Popular resistance to a court decision can lead to 
municipal inaction, which in turn forces additional, more assertive 
judicial intervention.41 It seems likely that in a significant number of 
zoning cases community resistance to the prospect of low- and moder-
ate-income housing will ibe sufficient to engender an uncooperative 
attitude on the part of the municipality42 and will force the court 
either repeatedly to invalidate local regulations or to undertake re-
zoning on its own. This problem will certainly confront the New Jer-
sey supreme court if the township of Mount Laurel fails to offer a 
satisfactory plan. 
The second option-determining the amount of land that the 
municipality must make available for low- and moderate-income 
housing, but allowing the municipality to decide which lands to 
rezone-requires a determination of the municipality's ''fair share" of 
regional housing needs.43 Even if a court is able to overcome the 
formidable difficulties involved in making a fair share determina-
tion, 44 its efforts may easily be frustrated by the familiar problem of 
:the intransigence of local officials. The zoning commission or other 
appropriate body could either refuse to rezone sufficient land to 
dmplement the "fair share" decision or ["ezone in a patently unsatisfac-
tory manner. 
Conceivably, the court could respond with its contempt power and 
jail the town officials until they agreed to comply. Yet, courts have 
been understandably hesitant to use the contempt power when local 
officials fail to comply with decrees ordering significant nonminister-
ial action. The contempt power was occasionally brought to bear 
40. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 
1141 (1969). 
41. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7-11 
(1971); Comment, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selection and the 
Failure of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REY. 1330 (1974). In Oakwood at 
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 NJ. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 
1974), the court was moved to provide standards for Madison, since the, town's 
revised zoning ordinance was deemed unsatisfactory. Initially, the court had simply 
invalidated the ordinance. 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971). 
42. The desire of many suburban communities to limit the availability of such 
housing within their boundaries is, of course, the very genesis of the exclusionary 
zoning problem. An example of strident opposition to a housing project is presented 
in N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 27, col. 1 (city ed.), which describes a town meeting 
in Westport, Connecticut. The proposal defeated at the meeting was modest, the 
erection of 400 garden apartment units with a maximum density of eight units per 
acre, but still met considerable opposition. 
43. Articles written from both legal and ,land-use planning perspectives have 
spoken in terms of a municipality's ''fair share" of the housing needs of the region in 
which it is located. See generally D. LISTOKIN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION 
(1975). 
44. These difficulties are considered in the text at notes 59-68 infra. 
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against uncooperative school officials in the early stages of desegrega-
tion efforts in tlle South, 45 but few judges in the last decade have 
found it productive in desegregation actions to hold such officials in 
contempt.46 The reasons for this reluctance may vary. In some 
cases it may spring from concern that an incarcerated local official 
will become a rallying point for community opposition; in other cases 
the reluctance may be due to the difficulty iinherent in identifying all 
culpable officials, or in measuring their noncompliance. A particu-
larly difficult problem arises when zoning officials are more subtle in 
their defiance and comply in a literal way with the court order but 
effectively nullify it.47 This could be accomplished by rezoning 
unfavorable industrial areas or marshes unfit for the development of 
dwellings, for example. Even a municipal governing body that 
makes a good-faith effort may fail to comply with the court's order 
because of an inability to reach a consensus as to where the "fair 
share" should be placed. This possibility of municipal inaction is of 
course enhanced if there is significant pressure from residents of the 
municipality who seek to keep their neighborhoods from being re-
zoned. 
In short, ,a court is apt •to encounter significant problems and 
frustrations if it seeks to effect far-reaching rezoning while allowing 
municipal officials to retain primary responsibility for the formulation 
and implementation of an acceptable rezoning plan. Because of 
these problems, a court may be compelled to ·bypass completely the 
unaccommodating local governing bodies and to rezone the munici-
pality itself. Such a court must first determine the amount of land 
within the municipality that should ·be allotted to low- and moderate-
income housing. It must next select those portions of the municipality 
that should be rezoned to satisfy the allotment. Presumably, these 
decisions would be made on the basis of testimony received during the 
trial and advice proffered by court-appointed urban planners. 48 Fi-
45. See, e.g., Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since 
Brown v. Board of Education, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 14-15 ( 197 5). 
46. For a critique of the use of the contempt power see Comment, supra note 41, 
at 1343-44. This piece also discusses the failure of judges to hold noncomplying local 
officials in contempt. ,fd. at 1340-41. The court in Pascack Assn. v. Mayor & 
Council, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 206, 329 A2d 89, 96 (L. Div. 1974) recognized the 
inappropriateness of contempt as a tool in implementing a zoning decree. In the 
course of the Boston desegregation litigation, federal Judge Garrity threatened three 
Boston School Committee members with civil contempt if they persisted in their 
refusals to approve a city-wide desegregation plan suitable to the court. N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 28, 1974, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). Judge Garrity dropped the threat before any 
penalties were meted out, however, after token compliance by the defendants. N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 9-, 1975, at 16, col. 1 (city ed.). 
41. See text at note 37 supra. 
48. This procedure was followed in Pascack Assn. v. Mayor & Council, 131 N.J. 
Super. 195, 329 A2d 89 (L. Div. 1974), discussed in text at note 27 supra. The 
Pascack court had tried court-supervised rezoning by the municipality but found the 
response of the town unsatisfactory and moved on to an affirmative remedy despite 
this earlier statement: 
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nally, of course, the court must either order the municipality to rezone 
the land according to the plan or simply declare the land rezoned. 
This process of judicial rezoning clewly violates the oft-repeated 
principle of judicial restraint in zoning matters.49 Yet, as the Pas-
cack court noted, 50 there are areas in which courts will fashion affirm-
ative remedies to vindicate constitutional rights. The Supreme Court 
has approved temporary judicial reapportionment to rectify state 
apportionment schemes that fail to weigh the votes of all residents 
equally.51 Courts have also blocked the construction of public hous-
ing that would exacerbate rather than alleviate patterns of residential 
segregation. In so doing, they have shorn housing agencies of certain 
powers ·and provided their own standards for future site selection. 52 
The most ex.tensive judicial activism has occurred in school desegre-
gation cases, 53 where courts have employed such affirmative tech-
niques as busing54 and placing a public high school into receiver-
ship55 in an attempt to provide an equal education for Black children 
victimized by segregated school systems. Thus, these judicial innova-
,tions provide some precedent for far-reaching relief in exclusionary 
zoning cases. 
Yet exclusionary zoning can ibe distinguished from these other 
areas of litigation in ways that counsel against any judicial attempt to 
rezone. One possible ground for distinction is based upon ,the Con-
stitutional rights at stake and upon the strength and fundamental 
nature of those rights. Although a comprehensive weighing of the 
various rights in these areas is ibeyond the scope of this Note, it is at 
least arguable that the right to education free of racial discrimination 
is more compelling than the right to low- or middle-income housing 
In holding the zoning ordinance under review invalid it must be noted that 
the court is not directing the municipality to rezone plaintiffs' property for multi-
family use. . • • [l]t is not the province of the court to specify zoning densities 
or to exercise any other control at this juncture . • • . Obviously, in view of 
the township's state of development, the range of choices available to it is lim-
ited, but these choices are properly a function of the legislative power which it 
must exercise with reasonable promptness and in accordance with the require-
ments of the statute. 
131 N.J. Super. at 198, 329' A.2d at 91. 
49. See notes 19-25 supra. 
50. 131 N.J. Super. at 202-03, 329' A.2d at 94. 
51. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533- (1964). 
52. See, e.g., Gantreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. 
Ill. 1969), affd., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), application for stay denied, 401 U.S. 
953, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971) discussed in Comment, note 41 supra. For 
the Supreme Court's disposition of a closely related case, see note 116 infra. 
53. See generally Piss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrim-
ination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. Cm. 
L. R.Bv. 742, 753-56 (1974). 
54. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), 
wherein the Supreme Court validated lower court use of busing to remedy patterns of 
segregation that resulted from past state action. 
55. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 10., 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). Federal Judge Garrity 
included in this order instructions that the headmaster, football coach, and other 
administrators of South Boston High School be transferred. 
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in a particular community. Yet even if the rights at stake are of 
equal force, numerous practical considerations may differentiate, in 
kind and in degree, the task of rezoning from the tasks of student 
assignment and reapportionment. First, there is considerable doubt 
as to the availability of "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards"56 for making zoning decisions. Perhaps even more important 
are problems concerning the effectiveness of any judicial remedy. The 
dominant consideration in this regard is the fact that exclusionary 
zoning plaintiffs seek judicial wlief as but an intermediate goal in a 
quest for the construction of new housing, while desegregation and 
reapportionment plaintiffs seek judicial relief as an end in itself. 
Finally, there is the fundamental question of whether any court 
should make the policy choices required in the zoning process. The 
remainder of this section considers the problems peculiar to judicial 
rezoning of a municipality.57 The extent to which judicial activism in 
other areas suffers from analogous problems and limitations will be 
considered in an effort to determine the relevance of these precedents 
for judicial rezoning. 58 
One multi-faceted problem underlying broad-based judicial rezon-
ing is the need for a court to discover standards for determining a 
particular municipality's fair share of regional low- and moderate-
income housing. 59 The majority opinion in Mount Laurel addressed 
this problem, but could suggest only that courts must look to the 
regional housing needs of persons with low ·and moderate incomes. 00 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Pashman advanced without elabora-
tion a four-step process for shaping a remedy: {1) identify the 
relevant region; (2) determine the present and future housing needs 
56. See note 59 infra. 
57. The court in Pascack Assn. v. Mayor & Council, 131 N.J. Super. 19:i, 329 
A.2d 89 (L. Div. 1974), did not have to face these problems "[b]ecause [since] the 
issue in contention involved only a narrow portion of the income and class spectrum, 
a compromise was possible. A more difficult and complex issue arises when 
proposals for rezoning would result in an influx of • • . lower-income and welfare 
families •.•. " Levin & Rose, Suburban Land Use War: Skirmish in Washington 
Township, in 1 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWIH 507, 513 (R. Scott ed. 1975). 
58. One should also note that the imposition of affirmative remedies in these 
other areas has not met with universal approval from legal scholars or from the 
public. See, e.g., Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of ConstitU• 
tional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 583 (1968). The public 
discontent with the desegregation decrees in Boston has been well publicized. See, 
e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). 
59. In deciding that legislative apportionment disputes were justiciable, the Su-
preme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), implied that "a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving a question would render it less 
suitable for adjudication. 369 U.S. at 217. It is instructive to note that the Mount 
Laurel court was able to hold the zoning scheme unconstitutionally exclusionary 
without clearly articulating the standards for determining "fair share." Without 
precise standards it is conceivable that a court can make such a determination (when, 
for example, there is no low-income housing due to zoning restrictions), but it is 
obviously impossible to formulate an affirmative remedy. 
60. <,7 N.J. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733. 
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of the region; (3) allocate these needs among the various municipali-
ties of the region; and ( 4) shape a remedial order. 61_ 
Justice Pashman's framework for addressing the fair share problem 
is analytically sound, but it neither addresses nor proposes solutions to 
,the problems raised at each of the steps. Thus, no manageable 
standards exist to determine the housing region of which the defend-
·ant municipality is a part. 62 Factors such as transportation facilities 
and employment opportunities are important considerations, but even 
when known they yield no ready answers. Once a relevant region has 
been defined, an intelligent determination of regional housing needs 
cannot be made by a court without substantial data and expert 
,testimony and advice. The validity of any housing-needs determina-
tion, moreover, depends upon the accuracy of the experts in predict-
ing population trends, future job opportunities, "turnover" dwellings 
from persons moving into new housing, and other factors. 63 Once a 
court has calculated regional housing needs, it faces the problem of 
allocating those needs .among the municipalities within the particular 
region. The court might ·allocate on the basis of factors such as 
population, total area, or amount of undeveloped l~d. Yet these 
criteria fail to provide a realistic basis for allocation of housing needs, 
since municipalities may vary in characteristics that are less easily 
quantified than population and area. 64 The various proposals of 
more elaborate schemes to effect equitable housing-need allocations 
may provide some guidance, but, predictably, they require the ac-
cumulation of even more data and the exercise of considerable judi-
cial and expert discretion. 65 
61. 67 N.J. at 215-16, 336 A.2d at 747. 
62. Indeed, the majority in Mt. Laurel admits that "[P]robably no hard and fast 
rule will serve to furnish the answer [to the question of the applicable region] in evecy 
case .••. " 67 N.J. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733. 
63. See Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved 
Issues, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 689, 711-13 (1975). 
64. Some of these complicating factors are described in E. BERGMAN, supra note 
2, at 34: 
Economic forces result in a general gradient of economic site-intensity usage for 
land in the metropolitan area, where inner locations are better suited to dense 
development and locations farther out are usually less densely developed. Urban 
land market forces also determine, in part, the structure and tenure characteris-
tics of the residential stock and its array of prices and rents. Closely related 
to the localized specialization of housing is the uneven distribution of employ-
ment opportunities over the metropolitan area. That is, if somehow all areas 
were to overcome locational specialization of housing and provide a metropolitan 
cross section, there is good reason to believe that employment might not be 
available for all workers near their "cross section" of residential opportunities. 
These two facts alone strongly suggest that since some municipalities are, by vir-
tue of their unique locations, better suited to certain ty_\)eS and mixes of residen-
tial and economic development than to others, requinng each' municipality to 
adopt a cross section of metropolitan housing opportunities is not the best course 
to follow. 
65. These considerations are mentioned in Rahenkamp, Fair Share Housing for 
Managed Growth, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST, No. 6, at 30 (1975). The 
author provides an allocation model based on developable land, a categocy that 
includes all undeveloped land except publicly encumbered and environmentally sensi-
774 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:760 
In sum, there are few "judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards" for determining fair share allocations of low- and moder-
ate-income housing. If trial courts are required to make such deter-
minations, they will be guided only by generalities found in appellate 
court decisions and by the ad hoc determinations of court-appointed 
experts. The ambiguities inherent in fair share determinations have 
already surfaced in one court's decision as to whether a community 
had failed to provide for its fair share of low-income housing. 00 A 
court may ·be able to avoid making a fair share determination in the 
course of ascertaining whether a community is practicing exclusionary 
zoning, 67 but the issue and its myriad problems are inescapable for a 
court that intends to rezone the excluding community. 08 
A court that manages to determine a community's "fair share" of 
housing needs next encounters the numerous problems associated 
with actually rezoning the municipality to provide the appropriate 
tive areas. He modifies this standard by using five adjustment factors: fiscal capacity 
to absorb growth, accessibility of the municipality to existing transportation systems, 
employment opportunities in and near each municipality, existing population density, 
and existing housing stock. He then recommends a basis for determining per year 
allocation. Without evaluating the validity of the proposal, one can recognize its 
complexity and anticipate the difficulty that a court (as opposed, for instance, to an 
administrative body) would have in applying it. Another scheme is proposed in 
more detail in E. BERGMAN, supra note 2. The complexity of the "performance 
standard" which he has devised is such that the bulk of this book of nearly three 
hundred pages consists of a description of the plan, a few examples of its application, 
and appendices of the kinds of data needed to apply it. 
66. In Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.,_ Pa.-, 341 A,2d 
466 (1975), a property owner had twice submitted a plan to build apartments in the 
township. Twice the plan was rejected because the zoning scheme did not allow any 
apartments. After Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), the property 
owner again applied for a building permit and sought a writ of mandamus to order the 
town to issue the permit. Upon the filing of the mandamus action the town passed 
an ordinance allowing 80 of the town's 11,589 acres to be used for apartments. 
The property owner alleged that rezoning of only 80 acres constituted "mere 
tokenism." A majority of the Pennsylvania ·supreme court agreed, without enunciat-
ing standards for deciding what would constitute a fair share. The dissenter, 
advancing population and housing statistics to buttress his argument, concluded that 
80 acres was a permissible first step in providing for apartments in an orderly 
fashion. _ Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 466. The opinion demonstrates how the 
determination of fair share becomes simply a matter of opinion in the absence of 
well-formulated standards. This case is discussed in Strong, Reporters Comment, 21 
LAND USE L. & ZoNING DIGEST, No. 10, 13 (1975). 
67. See note 59 supra. 
68. Despite some recent deviations from a strict application of its formula, see 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Supreme Court has provided a clear 
standard of one-person, one-vote to be applied in reapportionment cases. See Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In school desegregation cases the standards have been 
somewhat muddled. The requirement of past or present state action provides a 
starting point for deciding the case, but standards for busing decrees remain impre-
cise. See generally Read, supra note 45, at 33-38. In the initial Boston desegregation 
litigation, the court speculated that having the same ratio of Blacks to Whites in each 
school that existed in the whole school system might be desirable. The court noted, 
however, that such a solution was highly impractical. See Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. 
Supp. 410, 483 (1974), affd. sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
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, acreage for low- and moderate-income housing. 69 There are no clear 
standards for determining what tracts should be zoned for -housing 
needs, but the court must certainly consider a number of factors. 
These include existing drainage capacity and the cost of any required 
new sewerage systems, present traffic patterns and the capacity of 
existing roads to satisfy the needs of relatively high-density develop-
ments, ecological or landscape considerations, future demands for 
public services, and the location and capacity of existing schools, fire 
departments, and other municipal services. 70 The most difficult task 
for a court is to capitalize on investments previously made by the 
community.71 Although not essential for a decision as to the location 
of new housing, this task must be accomplished with some success if a 
court is not to undermine the sound financial structure of the munici-
pality. 
The court that rezones a municipality to accommodate low- and 
moderate-income housing must also consider whether it will retain 
jurisdiction to hear pleas for variances from the scheme it has man-
dated. 72 A developer might, for instance, wish to build a pharmacy 
in an area that the court has designated for high-density, multi-unit 
dwellings. If a court itself decides upon the request, there· will be 
little left of the principle that courts should not function as superzon-
ing bodies. Moreover, the court will be burdened with administrative 
duties until •the land that it has rezoned is totally developed. 73 On the 
69. The discussion of "fair share" problems in the context of a total judicial 
rezoning is equally applicable to the difficulties inherent in a court's selection of the 
second "option," as detailed in the text at notes 43-48 supra. The remainder of the 
discussion in this section is applicable only to a decision of a court to rezone, i.e., if 
the difficulties inherent in the first and second options have become apparent. 
70. See generally E.NvlRONMENT: A NEW Focus FOR LAND-USE PLANNING (D. 
McAllister ed. 1973); URBAN PLANNING GUIDE (W. Claire ed. 1969). B:ut for the 
view that suburban municipalities seldom deviate from a uniform plan for locating 
residential, commercial and industrial uses, see B. SIEGAN, supra note 33, at 5. Even 
if this is an accurate observation, one may argue that the municipality has at least had 
the opportunity to choose this pattern, whereas court-imposed zoning removes all 
choice. · 
71. For example, one should be aware of the inefficiency that results from 
overcrowding one school with children from newly constructed dwellings, while a 
school in another portion of the town has an excess capacity. At the very least, 
money must be expended to transport some of the children. Similar considerations 
attach to the utilization of existing sewerage systems. No single factor will be 
dispositive of the question of where to place new homes, but all such existing 
investments should be evaluated. See generally HANDBOOK ON URBAN PLANNING 79-
81 (W. Claire ed. 1973). 
72. See generally R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING §§ 14.01-.81 (1968). 
73. Courts have retained jurisdiction in desegregation cases for extended periods. 
See generally Read, supra note 45, at 18. In the Boston litigation, discussed in note 
68 supra, for example, the court has retained jurisdiction since its initial decision in 
June 1974. Since that time the court has reformulated a busing plan, N.Y. Times, 
May 11, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.), placed a high school into federal receiver-
ship, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.), transferred school officials, 
id., and formulated a safety plan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1975, at 44, col. 3 (late city 
ed.). At the time of publication of this Note, the court bad not relinquished its juris-
diction. 
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other hand, if the court does not retain this role, the municipality 
might liberally grant variances for uses other than low-income hous-
ing on the land that the court has rezoned. In this way the munici-
pality could effectively "rezone" the land once again, thereby circum-
venting the court's decree and precluding the development of low-
income housing. 
Thus, there are significant difficulties in formulating and imple-
menting standards in exclusionary zoning cases. Whether this task is 
more difficult than the analogous process in school desegregation 
cases is a matter for subjective judgment. Certainly it is not a 
significantly easier undertaking. While the drawing of district lines 
in reapportionment cases is attended with some degree of complexity, 
the over-all difficulty of fashioning a remedy in such cases is lessened 
by the absence of any problem of implementation similar to that 
encountered in desegregation and zoning suits. In short, the prob-
lems of devising standards in zoning controversies are significant even 
when compared to the similar difficulties that arise in other areas of 
judicial activism. Their magnitude and complexity caution courts to 
avoid broad-based rezoning if abstention is not incompatible with 
their constitutional obligations. 
The propriety of broad-based judicial rezoning is also influenced 
by factors relating to the effectiveness of the remedy and by consider-
ations of the desirable role of the judiciary. Obviously these factors 
-are enmeshed with the problems of discovering manageable stan-
dards, but some can indeed be isolated and evaluated to demonstrate 
that court-imposed rezoning would require a departure from the 
principles that have guided judicial activism in other areas. 
The desirability of a judicial remedy cannot be assessed without 
considering, for example, the potential for undesirable permanent al-
teration of the municipality that is inherent in any decision to rezone. 
A court that concludes it has unwisely ordered busing to desegregate 
a school system can easily correct its error by withdrawing or altering 
its order.74 If a court finds that a court-ordered reapportionment 
scheme was ill-advised, it can modify -the districts or allow the legisla-
ture to modify them. 75 In both of these areas, unwise decrees of the 
judiciary pertaining to complex or potentially inflammatory situations 
can usually be altered with a minimum of permanent harm. 76 When 
a court rezones, however, buildings may be erected and development 
plans previously under consideration may be abandoned. Thus, 
74. In the Boston litigation, the court revised its initial order on a number of 
occasions. See N.Y. Times, March 22, 1975, at 1, col. 4 (late city ed.); N.Y. Times, 
May 11, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
75. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 
(1964), explicitly framed its order as a temporary measure. 
76. Although the student assignment and busing plans can be changed with 
relative ease, it is not being suggested that the violence resulting from some desegrega• 
tion decrees has been insignificant. 
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unlike courts that reapportion to secure an effective political process 
or employ busing as a temporary measure to desegregate schools until 
society develops integrated and equal school facilities, the court that 
rezones makes a decision for the community that may not be subject 
to effective revision. 
Complementing this problem is the possibility that low-income 
housing will not be erected after court rezoning. The plaintiffs 
ultimate goal · in exclusionary zoning cases is the construction of 
housing, but as the Mount Laurel court itself recognized, "[c]ourts 
do not build housing nor do municipalities."77 A court that weighs 
the benefits and costs of judicial initiative in this area should bear in 
mind that the benefit ultimately to be gained is speculative and 
beyond ,the court's control. One possible complication is that devel-
opers will construct luxury apartments or condominiums on land that 
has been rezoned for multi-family use. While -a court might avert 
this possibility by placing a ceiling upon the cost of any dwellings 
constructed on the land, such restrictions are not permissible in all 
states.78 The most likely complication, however, is that no low-
income housing will be built regardless of permissive zoning patterns 
and the availability of land. 79 Indeed, some commentators argue that 
costs of construction make it impossible for private developers to 
profit from building and selling dwellings within the financial grasp 
of low- and moderate-income families.80 A busing decree remedies 
the inherently unequal81 patterns of school segregation and directly 
vindicates the rights of the plaintiffs. An intelligent judicial reappor-
77. 67 NJ. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. 
78. New Jersey may be one such state. See Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build 
Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN 
L.J. 653, 668 (1975). 
79. One observer has concluded land economics to be such thaf smaller lots, for 
example, will cause land prices to rise: "The landowner or owners whose land is the 
subject of a rezoning will, in almost every instance, attempt to realize a greater sale 
price on the total acreage (since more building lots will obtain) than they would have 
sought (or received) on the land as formerly zoned." Slade, supra note 5, at 16. 
80. See, e.g., Abeles, Madison Township: Twenty. Years Too Late, in NEW 
DIMENSIONS OF URBAN PLANNING: GROWTII CONTROLS 160 (J. Hughes ed. 1974). 
The author of this article examines the results of a liberalized zoning ordinance in 
Madison, New Jersey, a suburb that was subjected to a suit for its exclusionary zon-
ing practices. In the two years following passage of the new ordinance, the only two 
applications for multi-unit dwellings were for housing for the elderly, at conventional 
prices. The author concludes that it would have been more productive to serve a 
"complaint upon a non-existing defendant-a national housing policy." Id. at 164. 
See Gershen, Exclusionary Zoning: Where the Argument Fails, in NEW DIMENSIONS 
op URBAN PLANNING: GRowm CONTROLS 242,246 (J. Hughes ed. 1974). Support 
for this view is found in a distressing report that construction of all types of apart-
ment units in 1975 dropped to its lowest level since 1959. Although this may be 
partially due to the severe recession, building costs have risen so high that no large-
scale reversal of this trend is likely. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 4 
(city ed.); Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1976, at 28, col. 1 (midwest ed.). 
81.,This was the &'upreme Court's conclusion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
778 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:760 
tionment achieves precisely what was desired-equal electoral 
strength for each voter. Even the most sagacious rezoning decree, 
however, gives no assurance of curing the ill at which the plaintifr s 
efforts were doubtless directed. 
Another characteristic of judicial rezoning that undercuts its attrac-
tiveness is the inability of a court to hear from all affected parties in 
deciding upon a plan. 82 Issues of _housing and land-use control affect 
·the interests of environmentalists, commercial developers, housing 
builders, the poor, federal and state officials, the central city (if the 
municipality is a suburb), and, of course, the municipality whose 
zoning practices fall under attack. In the average case, not more 
than two or three of these groups are apt to be participants, yet all are 
bound in a sense by the decree. A court might ameliorate the 
problem by seeking amicus briefs or allowing intervention by one or 
more of these interested groups, but at some point the case will 
·become unwieldy under the weight of so many opposing factions. 
While this problem could conceivably arise in any zoning case, it is 
particularly acute when the zoning pattern of the entire municipality 
is at issue and the court is faced not with a relatively clear choice 
between -two distinct results, but with a panoply of competing inter-
ests, values, ano possible results. sa 
Related to the inability of courts to provide a forum for all con-
cerned segments of society is the fact that a rezoning court must 
inevitably make fundamental policy decisions of a sort generally left 
to the democratically selected branches of government. One author 
has analogized a court decision in another area of the law to pulling a 
strand of a spider web: "Pull a strand here, and a complex pattern of 
adjustments run through the whole web. Pull another strand from a 
different ·angle, and another complex pattern results."84 The ramifi-
cations of any court decision in the context of zoning cannot be 
narrowly confined. Whatever land the court eventually rezones for 
multi-family residential use will be unavailable for commercial, busi-
ness-office or industrial uses; this restriction on permissible uses 
becomes increasingly significant as the amount of a town's land 
suitable .for development diminishes. By deciding where population 
growth can be expected, the court in effect dictates that municipal 
services in a particular area are to be increased. Most importantly, 
82. See Haar v. Iatridis, Housing the Poor: Exclusion and the Courts, in 1 
MANAGEMENT & CoNTROL OF GROWTH 492, 496 (R. Scott ed. 1975). 
83. In the first decade of school desegregation cases the adversary interests were 
well defined. fu the last decade, however, the occasional opposition of concerned 
groups of Black citizens to busing and integration decrees has made these interests 
more difficult to identify clearly. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970); Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
Should similar sentiments proliferate, courts may find themselves unable to decide 
cases that have become political questions in the most literal sense of the phrase. 
84. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND THE .ARBITRATOR'S ROLE 8, 40 (M, Kahn ed. 1962). 
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judicial rezoning reduces municipal prerogatives for planned growth. 
By rezoning, a court preempts, or at least limits, the exercise of the 
municipality's judicially recognized right to place reasonable limita-
tions on its rate of growth. 85 
Judicial rezoning forecloses municipal policy making in so many 
areas principally because land-use planning often entails a choice 
among competing, mutually exclusive uses. 86 Advocates of land-use 
planning, as vocal today as ever, may often be motivated iby concerns 
far more legitimate •than the ignoble desire to exclude individuals 
because they are Black or poor.87 Accordingly, opposition to a 
proposai for a high-density housing development might well be based 
upon a sincere concern for environmental factors or upon a belief that 
the housing should be built elsewhere. Judicial rezoning may indeed 
challenge a municipality's parochialism, but it Ca.D; also interfere in a 
legitimate political debate over how the limited supply of land in a 
metropolitan area should 1be regulated. In other contexts, courts 
traditionally have tried to limit their interference with policy deci-
sions. 88 Thus, the possibility of several "legitimate" perspectives on a 
zoning question suggests that conflicts among these views should be 
resolved in a forum more democratic than a courtroom.89 
C. Withhold Affirmative Relief 
The final possible response for a coult confronted with a challenge 
to an entire zoning ordinance is to withhold all affirmative relief and 
85. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Assn. of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 
522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (zoning plan that limits population increase to 
substantially less than market would demand in order to avoid uncontrolled growth 
not an impermissible burden on interstate commerce); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 
N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (upholding scheme 
of sequential development). Large lot zones have been upheld when the zoning 
authority has demonstrated that it established these zones in accordance with a 
comprehensive regional plan which was adopted with a good faith view to all the 
needs of the region. See, e.g., Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County 
Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969). 
86. See Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use 
Regulation, 14 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming). 
87. See generally Burns, supra note 1; Sager, supra note 2. 
88. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. McGeary, 291 S.2d 28 (Fla. App. 
1974). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 40. 
89. One might argue that certain school desegregation decisions have compelled 
the creation of particular patterns of municipal services: busing, increased police 
protection, etc. However, these effects are quite clearly tied to enforcement of the 
decree. Police protection is not qualitatively different from enforcement of any 
judicial mandate by the executive branch of the government. Moreover, one hopes 
that the police presence will be temporary. Busing itself is a fairly limited area of 
infringement on municipal prerogatives, at least in comparison with alteration of the 
character of an entire town or city. Moreover, even some strong supporters of busing 
have recognized that once Blacks have achieved significant political representation, 
extensive judicial involvement in result-oriented antidiscrimination activities becomes 
more difficult to reconcile with democratic traditions. This, of course, is not to say 
that such judicial activism must therefore cease, but rather that reevaluation is 
necessary. See Fiss, supra note 53, at 772-73. 
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thus avoid the complexities and intrusive effect of judicial rezoning. 00 
A court can achieve this result by avoiding a decision on the merits, 
either by denying the plaintiffs standing or by holding that challenges 
unrelated to specific tracts of land are nonjusticiable. An alternative 
and preferable path is for the court to hear the case and to issue 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but •to withhold all affirmative 
relief unless and until a group gains specific property interests in the 
community. 
The Supreme Court chose the first path in Warth v. Seldin,01 a 
recent case in which standing was denied to several groups of plain-
tiffs, and in so doing erected a formidable barrier to the litigation of 
exclusionary zoning cases in federal courts. The Warth action was 
commenced by a variety of plaintiffs: persons allegedly excluded 
from the defendant municipality, persons within the neighboring city 
of Rochester who allegedly suffered higher tax rates because of the 
defendant suburb's exclusionary practices, and builders who allegedly 
suffered economic loss because they were 'barred by the exclusionary 
zoning from constructing multi-unit housing in the municipality. 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that each group of 
plaintiffs had failed to allege an injury that was sufficiently demonstra-
ble and concrete rto confer standing. Regrettably and somewhat 
remarkably, the Court failed to specify what interest or injury a 
plaintiff must aver in order to satisfy the constitutional and prudential 
considerations upon which -the standing requirement is based. The 
Court's opinion does suggest, however, that standing to challenge a 
zoning ordinance will be granted plaintiffs who either (1) own land 
in the municipality and have the resources and specific intent to 
construct low-income housing, or (2) have interests focused on par-
ticular lands within the municipality and have the resources and clear 
desire to purchase the lands for construction, or (3) are intended 
residents of a particular planned project that is obstructed by the 
zoning ordinance. By limiting standing in this manner, the Supreme 
Court has in effect precluded all persons from challenging zoning 
schemes in federal courts unless they are associated with specific 
projecrts planned for specific lands. 02 
90. Since the Mount Laurel court has already mandated that the town's zoning 
pattern be altered, either through the municipality's own initiatives or through some 
form of judicial remedy, it cannot be expected to back down in the event the township 
of Mount Laurel fails to act See 61 N.J. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734. 
91. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
92. The Supreme Court's decision on the standing issue does not, of course, bind 
state courts. Other avenues may be open to plaintiffs seeking a federal forum who 
are unable to allege sufficient personal harm. They could challenge the grant of 
federal funds to municipalities that do not provide for low income housing, since 
many of these programs make the funds contingent on certain fair housing practices. 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-5317 
(Supp. 1976) is one such program. Standing in federal court to challenge the 
disbursement of federal funds by the appropriate agencies when they do not monitor 
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A Pennsylvania court, in Commonwealth v. Bucks County,93 also 
followed this first path of refusing to adjudicate on the merits by 
holding that requests for general rezoning made on behalf of low-
income persons excluded from a county constituted nonjusticiable 
questions. The Bucks County litigation was initiated by a variety of 
plaintiffs (two of whom owned no land in Bucks County) who, 
without focusing their complaint on a particular plot of land,, sought 
sweeping equitable relief against the county and the fifty-four munici-
palities •that it embr-aces. In a per curiam opinion, the commonwealth. 
court adopted the opinion of the court of common pleas, which had 
unambiguously rejected judicial rezoning on both practical and theo-
retical grounds: 
In order to meet and resolve the problems imposed by plaintiffs in 
their presently hypothetical, far-ranging and totally unparticularized 
context, the Court itself, directly, or indirectly through the requested 
mandates to and oversight of the County planning commission and 
. . . the fifty-four separate municipalities, would. be required to as-
sume the awesome task of becoming a superplanning agency, with no 
expertise in the field; and as such the Court would .be required to make 
immediate and basic "initial policy determinations of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion," and to carry out this tremendous re-
sonsibility with an entire "lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it," in the language of the Baker v. Ca" 
opinion . . . . This responsibility we do not believe we are required 
to assume, and we therefore decline to do so. 94 
Yet even as it dismissed the action, the Pennsylvania court reaffirmed 
the principles of National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown 
Township Board of Adjustment95 and Girsh Appeal,96 which had au-
thorized judicial invalidation of zoning ordinance features that were 
unnecessarily exclusionary. 97 The court distinguished these earlier 
cases on the ground that the plaintiffs involved there had possessed 
specific property interests. By relying on this distinction, the court 
was able to employ the rationale of nonjusticiability -to impose con-
structive standing requirements similar to those later established in 
Warth. 
The approaches in Warth and Bucks County certainly avoid the 
problems inherent in judicial rezoning, but they also make it very 
difficult for persons excluded by a zoning scheme to vindicate their 
rights, for individuals who do not have land in a given community are 
the housing policies of communities receiving the assistance has already been granted 
by the Second Circuit in Evans v. Lynn,_ F.2d _ (2d Cir. 1975). This case, 
however, was apparently decided with reference to racial discrimination, and the 
success of alternative approaches is still a matter of speculation. 
93. 8 Pa. Commnw. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1130 (1974), affg. 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 179 (1972). 
94. 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 188, 302 A.2d at 904-05. 
95. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
96. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
97. 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 187, 302 A.2d at 904. 
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made dependent on convincing a builder to participate in a lawsuit 
against the municipality. However, builders of low- and moderate-
income housing, particularly in large metropolitan areas, can channel 
their resources into a number of different communities. In deciding 
upon housing sites, they doubtless consider whether they must expend 
time and resources to obtain an exemption from an exclusionary 
zoning ordinance. Many ·builders are presumably willing to make 
the effort necessary to apply for a variance, permit, or amendment to 
an unfavorable zoning scheme, but fewer are likely to view as worth-
while the funding of a full-scale court attack on an exclusionary 
ordinance. Rather than fund such lengthy and complex litigation, a 
builder will probably turn his efforts to a community ,that has already 
allocated land to low-and moderate-income housing and that contains 
a high proportion of low-income families. The result of this under-
standable tendency of builders is that low- and moderate-income 
families who seek housing within their means are channeled into 
cert$ communities and effectively excluded from others . 
..Successful attacks on a zoning ordinance can "open up" a munici-
pality to low- and moderate-income housing and thereby make it 
more attractive to potential builders. The problem, however, is that 
the Warth and Bucks County decisions make it extremely difficult for 
a plaintiff to challenge an ordinance in the first place unless a willing 
builder has already -been located. And as indicated, it seems likely 
:that a local organization that espouses the rights of low-income 
persons will be unable to attract a builder until it has successfully 
attacked the ordinance. 98 As one of the Warth dissenters asserted: 
The rights of low-income minority plaintiffs who desire to live in a 
locality ... seem to turn on the willingness of a third party ·to litigate 
the legality of preclusion of a particular project, despite the fact 
that the third party may have no economic incentive to incur the 
costs of litigation with regard to one project, and despite the fact 
that the low-income minority plaintiffs' interest is not to live in a 
98. Evidence of such a sentiment on the part of developers may be found in 
Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1974), vacated and 
rema!)ded to district court, 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1975), appeals court decision 
vacated and remanded to that court for further consideration, 422 U.S. 1052 (1975), 
remanded, 521 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3499 (U.S. 
March 8, 1976). In that case, the court held that a challenge to a munici-
pal ordinance that excluded low-rent housing projects unless approved by a ma-
jority of electors presented a nonjusticiable question. The court rested this con-
clusion on the accurate observation that a declaration of invalidity would not lead 
to housing construction because no present plans for such construction were offered. 
Ironically, a company had intended to erect a federally subsidized, low-rent project 
but it had desisted, even after a $50,000 expenditure, because of the likelihood of 
expensive and time-consuming litigation. 374 F. Supp. at 736 n.4. The case 
travelled up and down the appellate ladder for two years and is now to be dismissed 
on the basis of Warth v. Seldin. See 44 U.S.L.W. 3499 (U.S. March 8, 1976). 
Nonetheless, it presents a striking example of the need to allow activist plaintiffs 
without plans for housing construction to achieve some sort of victory in court with 
which to lure potential developers to previously "closed" municipalities. 
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particular project but to live somewhere in the town in a dwelling 
they can afford. 99 
The Warth and Bucks County decisions can perhaps be explained 
as attempts to exclude froin the courts both controversies that are 
insufficiently crystallized to warrant judicial intervention and cases in 
which the courts cannot reasonably fashion an adequate remedy. Yet 
the courts can further these generally valid objectives without com-
pletely denying a forum to organizational and class-action plaintiffs 
who are unable to find an interested builder prior to a successful 
attack upon the zoning ordinance. 
Courts should feel compelled to seek less drastic means of screen-
ing these cases in light of the substantial public benefits that may 
sometimes be generated by successful challenges to exclusionary ~on-
ing schemes. Therefore, in determining whether such a case is 
sufficiently developed to warrant judicial consideration, a court might 
beneficially loosen the rigid requirements of ripeness and concreteness 
that are applied to screen cases in other contexts. This would not 
open the floodgates to premature zoning challenges. Because exclu-
sionary zoning litigation is complex, time-consuming, and costly, 
many cases that are not ripe or concrete are voluntarily withheld from 
the courts, since a plaintiff is not apt to engage in such litigation 
unless it has a reasonable chance of later locating a willing builder. A 
court could rely on this high cost to filter out adequately those cases 
that do not warrant the expenditure of judicial effort. Thus, the need 
to -bar from the courts those controversies that are insufficiently 
crystallized fails to justify the overly restrictive approaches of the_ 
Warth and Bucks County courts. 
It is also clearly important to keep from the courts those controver-
sies for which the judiciary cannot fashion an adequate remedy. And, 
as explained above, numerous practical and prudential factors sup-
port the conclusion that judicial rezoning is an inappropriate remedy. 
There is little reason, however, why courts cannot devise a remedy 
that avoids the problems of judicial rezoning and yet satisfies the 
needs of plaintiffs seeking to "open" an entire community to low cost 
housing. The following alternative, unavailable to federal courts 
because of the Supreme Court's decision in Warth, exemplifies the 
flexibility that the judiciary can exercise in fashioning an adequate 
and minimally intrusive remedy. 
A court can withhold affirmative relief and yet still make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law after allowing the plaintiffs an opportu-
nity to prove that the defendant municipality has engaged in system-
atic exclusion of low- and moderate-income persons. While this 
course of action contemplates no rezoning, it may be distinguished 
99. 490 U.S. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis original). 
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from a simple dismissal in at least three respects:10° First, the thor-
ough airing of a municipality's exclusionary practices informs agen-
cies, legislators, and the public, and thus may ·trigger greater external 
pressure for change in the zoning practices of the municipality;101 
second, the court's findings might attract to the community develop-
ers who, without some proof of judicial sympathy, would be unwilling 
to try to penetrate the exclusionary scheme; finally, a judicial declara-
tion that a town is practicing exclusionary zoning might prompt the 
town to change its ordinance in an attempt to stave off further 
litigation. 
In order to avoid -being purely advisory and to satisfy fully the 
needs of nonpropertied plaintiffs excluded from a community, a 
judgment that a municipality has unlawfully practiced exclusionary 
zoning should be ·binding in suits subsequently brought by the same 
or other plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief with respect to specific 
plots of land. This would enable the original plaintiffs to assure 
potential developers of a favorable judicial reception if the municipal-
ity attempted to block a planned :housing project. Until a significant 
number of low- and moderate-income dwellings had been erected in 
the area, later litigation would be limited to issues concerning the 
appropriateness of the particular site for the planned project.102 A 
municipality that triumphed in the initial suit could expect to be 
finished with the matter, because other plaintiffs, even though not 
technically bound, would be runlikely to expend resources to challenge 
100. The authority to withhold injunctive relief even if a wrong is discovered 
derives from general equitable principles. Virtually every discussion of a court's 
equity powers emphasizes that an injunction is granted only at the reasonable 
discretion of the court. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. 
Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); City of San Diego v. AFSCME Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 
3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1972). Courts have been particularly responsive to the 
public interests that might be adversely affected by an injunction. See, e.g., Pennsyl-
vania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1934); Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 
88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1970); Nielson v. Corbo, 35 App. Div. 2d 580, 313 N.Y.S.2d 452 
(1970). The disruptive effects of injunctive relief or interference with other govern• 
mental bodies could offset even the need for protection of constitutional rights. See 
generally Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1965), 
In an appropriate case, a court in a jurisdiction permitting declaratory judgments 
might construe the request for general injunctive relief as a request for declaratory 
judgment relief and proceed accordingly. This construction is apparently permissible 
for a federal court. See Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301, 304 & n.8 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966). . 
101. A commentator who doubts the efficacy of most exclusionary zoning litiga-
tion nonetheless concludes that the real benefit from the New Jersey judiciary's 
activism has been the "gradual creation of a climate for legislative land use reform." 
Mallach, supra note 78, at 685. Such a "climate" might be created by the judiciary's 
denunciations of specific exclusionary patterns and implicit promises to act whenever 
an appropriate, narrowly drawn case is presented. 
102. At some point, a court might decide that the judgment should no longer be 
implemented because rough estimates of a municipality's "fair share" of low-income 
housing have at least arguably been attained. 
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anew the entire zoning scheme so long as the original plaintiffs had 
been adequately represented. · 
This response is obviously a type of declaratory judgment, a rem-
edy that one federal court refused to grant nonresident plaintiffs who 
were not connected with any particular planned housing project.103 
Although the case is probably not good authority, 104 it may indi-
cate that some courts wiH view an opinion of this sont: as more 
advisory than declaratory. But this seems inappropriate, because the 
grievance of nonpropertied plaintiffs does constitute "an actual con-
troversy ,that has not reached the stage at which either party may seek 
a coercive remedy."105 A formula with which to test the appropriate-
ness of a declaratory judgment in a given situation has been offered 
by Justice Murphy: "Basically, the question in each case is whether 
,the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a 
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, 
of sufficient immediacy .and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgm.ent."106 This formulation has been augmented by 
Wright and Miller, who assert that "[t]here is little difficulty m 
finding an actual controversy if all of the acts ·that are alleged to 
create liability already have occurred."107 These guidelines support 
.the use of a declaratory judgment in exclusionary zoning situations so 
long as courts recognize that the important question is not whether a 
plaintiff has been denied a building permit, but whether a plaintiff 
has been injured because a municipality's exclusionary practices deter 
developers from seeking such a permit.108 
There is one important distinction between this proposed judicial 
response and the normal declaratory judgment remedy. Under the 
proposed remedy, but not under a declaratory judgment, the individu-
al who later seeks a coercive remedy need not have been a plaintiff in 
!the original action. As discussed above, 109 this extension of the use 
of a declaratory judgment may be very important if those persons who 
are being excluded are to receive any judicial protection; it thus seems 
warranted. 
103. Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1974), discussed 
in note 98 supra. 
104. The decision was vacated on the basis of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975). See note 98 supra. 
105. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 100 (2d ed. 1970). 
106. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 
107. 10 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PROCEDURE § 2757 
(1973 ). 
108. 'These guidelines for the use of declaratory judgments refer to / ederal judicial 
actions. State courts are governed by state constitutions in deciding whether a given 
controversy is suitable for exercise of the court's jurisdiction. As Professor Wright 
has noted, most states have declaratory judgment acts similar to the federal statute. C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 105, § 100. A state court should consider satisfaction of the 
federal guidelines as persuasive evidence that an appropriate case for a declaratory 
judgment has been presented. 
109. See notes 98 & 99- supra and accompanying text. 
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Because courts consider the appropriateness of a declaratory judg-
ment in light of the particular circumstances, they obviously would 
retain much discretion in deciding whether to hear a case on the 
merits. Thus, for example, if a suit is brought against a municipality 
that has allowed some low-income housing but that currently seeks to 
restrict its rate of growth, the court may simply refuse to decide the 
case or, if it wishes, may find for the municipality on the basis of the 
zoning ordinance's presumptive validity. By deferring to a munici-
pality's reasonable determination of housing needs in borderline 
cases, a court can thereby avoid involving itself with the development 
of "fair share" or other standards -that are necessary for rezoning. The 
proposed remedy is obviously most appropriate in an extreme case, 
such as Mount Laurel, where there is no low-income housing and a 
clear record of systematic exclusion. In such a case a court can 
afford relief ·and •avoid devising exact standards unless and until the 
number of plaintiffs who seek ito implement the court's judgment 
approaches a range in which the municipality's fair share is arguably 
satisfied.110 
This course of action permits the judiciary to intervene in some 
cases on behalf of unlawfully excluded persons. More generally, it 
permits the courts to retain their prestige as a haven for those who 
have suffered legal injury. Yet, the remedy is appropriately limited 
to the more obvious instances of exclusion, since judicial involvement 
in less clearly defined land-use controversies requires the same exper-
tise and policy decisions that rezoning demands.111 
110. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. 
111. One critic has suggested another judicial response that is potentially more 
far-reaching than widespread judicial rezoning. This commentator proposes that 
courts invalidate the zoning enabling legislation that has improperly delegated to the 
municipalities the authority to decide matters of statewide concern (i.e., housing for 
lower income groups). The proposal also contemplates that courts will require any 
delegation of land-use authority to be made in such a way that substantial inequality 
will not result. The author asserts that if this safeguard is not possible, the courts 
should not allow the delegation. Note, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 727, supra note 4, at 
735-41. Such an approach in the area of state delegation of its fiscal responsibility 
was taken by the New Jersey supreme court in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 
A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). A remedy was delayed in order to give 
the legislature time to act. After two years, however, there was no appreciable 
response. Accordingly, a sharply divided court ordered the use of a system of 
disbursement of funds that it had devised to alleviate inequities. Robinson v. Cahill, 
67 N.J. 333, 33l> A.2d 193 (1975). 
Even the New Jersey supreme court may balk at such an approach in the area of 
zoning, for the New Jersey constitution specifically authorizes delegation to munici-
palities. NJ. CONST. art. 4, § VI, para. 2. Even if this hurdle could be overcome, 
one might still question this course of action, for recalcitrance on the part of the 
legislature could lead to a judicial system of land-use planning. This result would not 
only clash with the principle of separation of powers, it would also lead courts into an 
area in which they are hardly competent. See Note, 6 RUTGERS-G\MDEN L.J. 727, 
supra note 4, at 738. Finally, this proposed solution cannot guarantee the construc-
tion of housing to any greater extent than the other suggested responses. 
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ill. EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE .APPROACHES AND 
SoME L:eGISLATIVE .ALTERNATIVES 
787 
Each of ·the activist judicial responses to an exclusionary zoning 
challenge has serious shortcomings. Although the use of invalidation 
alone, or of court-supervised rezoning by the municipality may, at 
times, produce satisfactory results, an uncooperative municipality can 
easily thwart a court that relies upon one of these restrained ap-
proaches and thereby compel judicial rezoning.112 But rezoning is 
fraught with burdensome administrative complexities and with the 
danger that the court will preempt policy decisions ·that belong to the 
elective branches of government. 113 The proposed response, which 
couples a refusal to take affirmative steps with a declaration that the 
municipality's zoning scheme is unlawful, tries to balance the right of 
low-income persons not to be excluded with the limitations on judicial 
activism. In reality, of course, this response preserves the status quo 
·and makes it likely that subsequent legal action by potential develop-
ers will be necessary to open the municipality to persons of below-
average means. Moreover, the proposed remedy is likely to be 
effective only where the facts leave no doubt as to the existence of an 
exclusionary scheme. 
The elusiveness of an appropriate remedy is at least partially 
explained by the fact -that victory in an exclusionary zoning suit is but 
an intermediate goal of the plaintiffs. At issue in such cases is the 
plaintiffs' right not to be excluded from the municipality,114 yet 
without the construction of relatively inexpensive housingi in the 
municipality, a judgment affirming this right is merely academic. The 
prospeots for private development are, in general, not bright, 115 nor 
have federally subsidized housing programs been particularly success-
ful in the past.116 While the Housing and Community Development 
112. See notes 41 & 48 supra. 
113. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text. 
114. The commentators who have argued most strongly for judicial activism in 
remedying patterns of exclusionary zoning have assumed the existence of a far-
reaching constitutional right without fully examining the problems that a court will 
face in upholding these ''rights." See, e.g., Burns, supra note 2; Rubinowitz, Exclu-
sionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L REF. 625 (1973). 
Indeed, one author has even concluded that the courts are the best suited of any 
governmental body to decide complex questions of land use in metropolitan areas. 
Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 
69 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1971). On the basis of an examination of the possible 
remedies, this Note simply disagrees with that conclusion. 
115. See notes 80 & 81 supra and authorities cited therein. 
116. See generally H. AARoN, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES (1972). 
As this issue was being readied for publication, the Supreme Court decided that 
federal courts may order the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
select public housing sites outside a core city where HUD has violated the fifth 
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by building low-cost housing that 
perpetuated segregated neighborhoods. Hills v. Gantreaux, 44 U.S.L.W. 4480 (U.S. 
April 20, 19'76). The impact of this decision upon suburban housing patterns is 
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Act of 1974117 conditions block grants to municipalities on local 
acceptance of housing for persons who work, but do not reside, in the 
community, it is premature to evaluate the program's success.U8 
Thus, not only is the right not to be excluded through zoning 
essentially an abstract one when considered alone, but the Supreme 
Court has, in Lindsey v. Normet, 119 explicitly declared that there is no 
federal constitutional right to housing. Not even the New Jersey 
supreme court has suggested that the constitution of that state con-
fers such a right. Therefore, plaintiffs who successfully demonstrate 
exclusionary zoning cannot return to court to convert their "interme-
diate" right into low-income housing. 
The difficulties in formulating satisfactory remedies in exclusionary 
zoning cases are best understood by examining them in -the context of 
the judicial role as it has evolved over the past twenty years. Since 
Brown v. Board of Education, 120 the Supreme Court has demon-
uncertain for several reasons: first, the Court rested heavily upon the fact that HUD 
had assisted the discriminatory housing policy of ithe Chicago Housing Authority; 
second, the Court assured municipalities that a "remedial decree would neither force 
suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace the 
rights and J;JOWers accorded local government entities under federal or state housing 
statutes or existing land use laws." 44 U.S.LW. at 4487. Thus, while the decision 
may profoundly influence the kinds of efforts to construct housing that HUD makes 
in metropolitan areas, it does not affect the amount of housing that is actually built or 
the zoning of suburban communities. 
117. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-5317 (Supp. 1976). 
118. The opposition of suburbs to low-income housing has emerged in this context 
as well. Two Chicago suburbs have each turned down over 2 million dollars in fed-
eral funds in order to forestall such housing. 27 LAND UsE L & ZoNING D10EST, No. 
7, at 2 (1975). One heartening development is the recent decision of a federal court 
to block -the transfer of 4 million dollars in community development funds to seven 
Hartford, Conn., suburbs. City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 
1976). The court decided the case on the relatively narrow ground that the commu-
nities had not submitted the required projections of future housing needs for low-
income residents. It also indicated, however, that the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development must give weight to these projections and other sources of in-
formation in considering reapplications from the municipalities involved. 408 F. 
Supp. at 903. Thus there remains the possibility of keeping funds from suburbs which 
do not act in good faith to meet projected needs. 
119. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Court sustained two Oregon provisions for rather 
summary eviction for nonpayment of rent. In the course of the majority opinion, 
Justice White stated: ''We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every 
social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitu-
tional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality • • • ." 405 U.S. at 74. 
This principle has been applied by a Court of Appeals in considering section 1415(7) 
of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1430 (1970). That 
section provides that no loans can be made for any planned low-rent projects unless 
the local governing authority has consented. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan 
Housing Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974). In upholding the statute, the 
court commented: ''!In Lindsey v. Normet . . • the Court held that no one has a 
constitutional right to adequate housing. . . • [l]t follows that he has no such right 
in a municipality in which he does not reside." 500 F.2d at 1093. 
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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strated a willingness to confront some of the social problems that leg-
islatures and executives have too long neglected. The civil rights 
movement of the 1950's and 1960's relied heavily upon the activism 
of the federal judiciary in halting discriminatory practices.121 Advo-
cates of other social ·and political changes also rurned increasingly to 
the courts to the point where opposition to a war developed into a 
series of unsuccessful lawsuits.122 Thus, exclusionary zoning is only 
one among many social conflicts that have been brought to ,the courts 
for resolution. In this area, though, •the judiciary is confronted with 
a situation that is simply not conducive to judicial solution. Al-
though the judiciary, in confronting racial, ethnic, and sex-based 
discrimination, has been both an effective agent of some reform, and 
a catalyst to other change~, it is incapable of negating the effects of 
parochial zoning and legislative neglect of low-income housing needs. 
Judicial incapacity and legislative unwillingness to remedy zoning and 
·housing patterns combine to present an unwelcome prospect of future 
inaction. 
There are, however, a few indications that some states will attempt 
legislative solutions to the problems raised in exclusionary zoning 
controversies.123 A legislative scheme mandates social policies and 
standards that have been determined through the political process and 
hence, presumably, have significant popular support. In addition, 
legislatures can establish administrative agencies to oversee the imple-
mentation of the standards enacted. Finally, legislative action can 
coordinate efforts to counteract exclusionary zoning with the con-
struction of needed housing. Legislative programs have not prolifer-
ated, but a few states have enacted laws designed to "open up" 
suburbs to low- and moderate-income housing. In addition, the 
American Law Institute has completed a Model Land Development 
Code, which provides for state controls upon a municipality's regula-
tion of proposed low- and moderate-income housing.124 It is inter-
121. The Supreme Court invalidated a variety of laws which had discriminatory 
effects. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (segregated 
jails); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation statute); Anderson 
v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (statute requiring the race of every candidate to 
appear on the ballot); New Orleans City Park Improv. Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 
(1958) (per curiam) (segregated parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) 
(per curiam) (segregated buses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 
(1955) (per curiam) (segregated beaches). 
122. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 103!> (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme 
Court consistently refused to consider the issue. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 
400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. !>34 (1967). 
123. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20 to 23 (Supp. 1974). 
124. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1975). The 
Code posits certain categories of development as having statewide or regional signifi-
cance. One such category in section 7-301(4)(d) 'is the "development of housing for 
persons of low and moderate income." Section 7-502 allows a denial of an applica-
tion for a development permit to be appealed to a state agency if the application 
involves an issue of statewide or regional significance. A commentator has suggested 
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esting to note that the Mount Laurel court recognized the advantages 
of legislative alternatives even as it intimated a willingness to re-
zone.125 A similar sentiment was expressed by a New York court 
that had struggled to formulate standards for testing the validity of an 
ordinance that excluded multi-unit housing.126 The court acknowl-
edged its duty to continue to assess the validity of zoning schemes, but 
its preference for a legislatively created regional or state body to 
perform this function was obvious. 
The most notable of the state programs to date is the Massachusetts 
zoning appeals law, which was enacted in 1969 to facilitate the 
approval of low- and moderate-income housing projects.127 Under 
the Massachusetts scheme, any public agency or "limited dividend or 
nonprofit organization" that proposes to build low- or moderate-
income housing may make a single application to a local board of 
appeals. This application makes unnecessary separate applications to 
the various agencies, including the zoning commission, which have 
jurisdiction over certain features of the project.128 Local boards are 
required to act relatively quickly, since a failure to respond within a 
specific period is deemed an approval of the project.129 Denial of an 
application by a local board may be appealed to a state agency, the 
Housing Appeals Committee, which is also required to process appli-
cations expeditiously.130 The Appeals Committee is empowered to 
vacate an adverse decision of a local board and to direct the issuance 
of a comprehensive permit.131 In short, the law guarantees an eligi-
that the requirement for state scrutiny of any large scale development, section 7-
301 ( 1 ), will give the state agency opportunity to halt the construction of large-lot 
houses if the development would remove substantial acreage from the market. See 
Note, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 727, supra note 4, at 750-51. Further hope for low-
and moderate-income housing is provided by section 7-305 of the Code, which for• 
bids a municipality to allow any development that will create 100 or more jobs for 
nonresident employees unless there is, or will be, adequate housing within the 
immediate vicinity. 
125. 67 N.J. at 18!>-91, 336 A.2d at 732-33. It has also been argued that 
comparison with legislative remedies may reveal more effective alternatives than those 
available from the courts. This argument contends that title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-5 (1970), which authorizes HBW guidelines, 
demonstrates that judicial activity alone cannot achieve full school desegregation. See 
Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at 1158. 
126. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, -, 341 N.E.2d 236, 
243 (1975). 
127. MAss. GEN. LA.ws ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20 to 23 (Supp. 1974). 
128. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (Supp. 1974). 
129. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (Supp. 1974). 
130. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, § 22 (Supp. 1974). 
131. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, § 23 (Supp. 1974). The standard for this 
review is whether the denial was consistent with local needs, a criterion defined in 
section 20. One component is the proportion of low- and moderate-income units in 
the city or town. If more than ten per cent of the units in the municipality are low-
or moderate-income housing, or if more than one and one-half per cent of all land 
consists of such housing, local needs are presumed satisfied. -In addition, a town need 
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ble developer a relatively expeditious and inex.pensive procedure, with 
an appeal to an obviously sympathetic agency. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Board of Appeals 
of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee,132 upheld the constitu-
tionality of these provisions, and in the course of doing so clarified 
several aspects of the law. The court concluded that the law "repre-
sents the Legislature's attempt to satisfy the regional need for housing 
without stripping municipalities of their power to zone."133 It inter-
preted the law to mean that an applicant under the scheme need not 
·possess title to the proposed site, 134 but that the ·board of appeals o_r 
housing committee may require disclosure of present or planned 
property interest in the site, and condition a permit on certain prop-
erty interest requirements. Thus, applicants can receive approval of 
their plans before acquiring •the property, but individuals who have no 
potential interest in the site can •be barred from making frivolous 
applications. 
The Massachusetts law has been criticized by several commenta-
tors, isi:; principally for the modest amount of low-income housing that 
a community can present and still fulfill its "local needs."136 Other 
perceived shortcomings in :the scheme include its failure to coordinate 
environmental considerations with housing needs, its failure to define 
the region for which minimum needs are to be evaluated, and the 
possible exclusion of private developers from the benefits of ,the law. 137 
Nonetheless, there have been quantifiable housing gains as a result of 
the legislation. As of June 1973, local appeals boards had granted 
six comprehensive permits under the new procedures, and construc-
tion was underway on three of the sites.138 During the same period 
the Housing Appeals Committee issued five decisions, all of which 
overturned denials of comprehensive permits by local boards.139 
While these developments are hardly revolutionary, they do repre-
sent progress in the economic integration of some communities.140 
Significantly, the Massachusetts legislature has not ceased its effort to 
not allow a project if its approval would result in commencement of construction of 
low- or moderate-income housing on over three-tenths of one per cent of all privately 
owned land in the municipality, or ten acres, whichever is larger. 
132. _ Mass. -, 294 N.B.2d 393 (1973). This holding was reaffirmed in 
Mahoney v. Board of Appeals,_ Mass.-, 316 N.E.2d 606 (1974). 
133. _Mass.at-, 294 N.E.2d at 422. 
134. _ Mass. at-, 294 N.E.2d at 420. 
135. See, e.g., Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach in the 
Exclusionary Wall, 54 B.U. L. REV. 37 (1974); Note, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 727, 
supra note 4, at 743-46. 
136. See note 131 supra. 
137. See Note, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 727, supra note 4, at 744 & n.113 and 
745-46. 
138. Note, 54 B.U. L. REv. 37, supra note 135, at 72. 
13!). Id. 
140. Cf. B. SmoAN, supra note 33, at 174-75. 
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deal with the problems of parochial land use controls, for it recently 
established a regional body with authority over local zoning.141 
Other states have established state and regional agencies with 
varying degrees of authority.142 The New York Urban Development 
Corporation, created in 1969, 148 was originally empowered to over-
ride local zoning ordinances in order to construct low income hous-
ing, but in 1973 the New York legislature rendered this power 
nugatory ·by granting municipalities a veto over any proposed residen-
tial project.144 The Development Corporation was progressively 
weakened -as a provider of funds for low-income housing by the New 
York fiscal crisis until, in February 1975, it became insolvent.14G 
Funds have been obtained to pay off existing obligations, but New 
York has suspended all plans for state-subsidized housing construc-
tion.146 Thus, what -began as the powerful cornerstone of a most 
ambitious state program, combining land use powers with authority 
to construct housing, has developed into a state corporate entity with 
little potency. 
Meanwhile, attempts to legislate anti-exclusionary laws have been 
defeated in a number of states,147 including New Jersey, the locus of 
the Mount Laurel litigation.148 It appears, then, that the future of 
widespread legislative action to counteract exclusionary zoning_ re-
mains uncertain and the prospects for an upsurge in low- and moder-
ate-income housing construction remain bleak. 
141. 27 LAND UsB L. & ZoNING DIGEsr, No. 2, at 3 (1975). There have been 
many suggestions for regional solutions. See, e.g., Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The 
Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y. L.F. 732 (1970); Weinberg, Regional 
Land-Use Control: Prerequisite for Rational Planning, 46 N.Y.U. L. RP.v. 786 
(1971); Comment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. 
RP.v. 1251 (1966). But see Burchell, Listokin & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls 
of the Regional Remedy, 1 URBAN LAW. 262 (1975). 
142. All but the most recent of these programs are compiled and described in U.S. 
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D CoNG., 2D SESS., SI'ATB LAND 
USB PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1974). 
143. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6251-6285 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Discussions 
of the purposes and structure of the UDC as originally conceived may be found in 
Quirk & Weiss, Homeownership for the Poor: Tenant Condominiums, The Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1968 and the Rockefeller Program, 38 CORNELL L. 
R.Bv. 811, 849-66 (1969'); Reilly & Schulman, The State Urban Development Corpo• 
ration: New York's Innovation, 1 URBAN LAw. 129' (1969). 
144. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS§ 6265(5) (McKinney Supp. 1975), added by N.Y, 
LAws 19'73, c. 446, § 3. 
145. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.); N.Y. Times, Feb. 
26, 1915, at 1, col. 2 and at 20, col. 1 (late city ed.), An analysis of the coUapse 
is provided in N.Y. Times, March 16, 1975, § 8, at 1, col. 5 (late city ed.). 
146. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (late city ed.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 
9, 1975, at 127, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
147. Proposals for schemes similar to the Massachusetts law have been proposed 
and defeated in both Connecticut and Wisconsin. Note, 54 B.U. L. RP.v. 37, supra 
note 135, at 73 n.243. 
148. See Mallach, supra note 78, at 678-81. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In a sense, the only sure conclusion is that the appropriate judicial 
response to exclusionary zoning cases is not easily ascertained. The 
initiative of some state legislatures has relieved certain courts of the 
need to make and implement land-use decisions. Yet many legisla-
tures, including that of New Jersey, have failed to take action against 
exclusionary practices and thereby forced individuals to institute 
Mount Laurel and similar lawsuits. It has thus been left to the courts 
of these states to decide upon a course of action for resolving the 
controversies that will inevitably confront them. 
In determining its posture in such cases, a court should realistically 
assess the limitations of the judiciary and should tailor its decrees so 
,as to prompt state legislative action or munioipa!l alteration of exclu-
sionary zoning patterns. Even if its exhortations fall upon deaf ears, 
·however, a court should not readily take on the myriad problems 
inherent in intelligently rezoning a municipality. 
The most feasible remedy in a situation similar -to Mount Laurel is 
a declaratory judgment. If a court declines to rezone an entire 
municipality but declares that the municipality has engaged in unlaw-
ful exclusion, a property owner can later use this judgment to chal-
lenge any refusal to grant a variance, permit, or zoning amendment 
for the construction of concentrated, multi-unit dwellings. While this 
later litigation over a single piece of land could well introduce the 
problems inherent in broad-based rezoning, it would do so on a 
smaller scale, with the issues more clearly in focus. Since it is 
unlikely that a declaration of unlawful exclusi.on will precipitate a 
flood of litigation by developers anxious to build low-income housing, 
a court adopting this posture need not fear that it will be called upon 
to rezone an entire community by "increments." 
The temptation for those who desire decent housing for the na- -
tion's less affluent to advocate increased judicial activism will doubt-
less grow as the disheartening economies of construction exacerbate 
the already-existing shortage. Yet any "victories" of plaintiffs in 
exclusionary zoning cases will be hollow absent the development of 
significant -programs for housing construction. In some cases, devel-
opers will doubtless take advantage of a declaration of unlawful 
zoning by seeking permission to build subsidized or other lower-
income housing in the community involved. However, in those cases 
where builders are not willing to utilize the decree, the resources 
marshalled for the litigation might be better expended in promoting 
state or federal programs that compel suburbs to deal realistically 
with the housing problems of the metropolitan areas in which they are 
_ located. Advocates of suburban economic integration should, there-
fore, concentrate their efforts upon the enactment and implementa-
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tion of laws that integrate land use decisions with adequately financed 
housing construction.149 
149. Thus, the best-directed efforts might steer away from establishing a constitu-
tional right and instead concentrate on developing statutory programs. This may 
disturb some, for legislation is subject to repeal, whereas a constitutional right 
presumably possesses a vitality independent of legislative whim. However, some of 
the most important social goals do not lend themselves to transformation into 
constitutional rights. It is difficult to imagine, for example, a more important social 
goal than the delivery of adequate health and nutritional care to every person in the 
country. It is also difficult to imagine how such a goal could emerge as a court-
enforceable constitutional right. What is needed is the inculcation of a national 
attitude that includes commitment to the achievement of these aims. Prescriptions 
for engendering such an attitude are hardly self-evident, but this may reflect a need 
for an effort which seeks more than a few victories in court. 
